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Abstract This paper presents a numericalmethod for the characterization ofMarkov-perfect
equilibria of symmetric differential games exhibiting coexisting stable steady states. The
method relying on the calculation of ‘local value functions’ through collocation in overlap-
ping parts of the state space, is applicable for games with multiple state variables. It is applied
to analyze a piecewise deterministic game capturing the dynamic competition between two
oligopolistic firms, which are active in an established market and invest in R&D. Both R&D
investment and an evolving public knowledge stock positively influence a breakthrough prob-
ability, where the breakthrough generates the option to introduce an innovative product on the
market. Additionally, firms engage in activities influencing the appeal of the established and
new product to consumers. Markov-perfect equilibrium profiles are numerically determined
for different parameter settings and it is shown that for certain constellations the new product
is introduced with probability one if the initial strength of the established market is below a
threshold, which depends on the initial level of public knowledge. In case, the initial strength
of the established market is above this threshold, and the R&D effort of both firms quickly
goes to zero and with a high probability the new product is never introduced. Furthermore,
it is shown that after the introduction of the new product the innovator engages in activities
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weakening the established market, although it is still producing positive quantities of that
product.
Keywords Markov-perfect equilibrium · Skiba curve · Collocation · R&D competition ·
Product innovation
1 Introduction
Since the seminal contributions of Sethi [19], Skiba [20] and Dechert and Nishimura [9],
it has been shown that rational planning over an infinite planning horizon can go along
with outcomes that crucially depend on initial conditions. Such outcomes are denoted as
history-dependent solutions, and the basins of attraction of the different long-run equilibria
are separated by Skiba thresholds. Apart from environmental and resource economics, where
such path dependencies have received a lot of attention (e.g., [22]), Skiba phenomena have
also been identified in different dynamic industrial organization problems (e.g., [3,4,17]).
Due to the nonlinear structure underlying such problems with multiple long-run equilibria,
which are mostly represented by stable steady states, (partial) analytical characterizations of
optimal dynamics in Skiba scenarios can typically be given only for dynamic optimization
models with one-dimensional state spaces. Therefore, different numerical approaches have
been developed to characterize optimal solutions in problems with multiple stable steady
states. These methods rely on the numerical calculation of stable paths in the state-costate
system derived from the Maximum Principle [13,15], nonlinear model predictive control
[14], or collocation [4].
In spite of this rich literature, relatively little attention has so far been paid to Skiba
phenomena arising in dynamic models with multiple decision makers, where strategic inter-
actions occur. Dechert and O’Donnellv [10] show path dependency of the state trajectory in
a Markov-perfect equilibrium of a stochastic discrete time shallow lake game. Dockner and
Wagener [12] obtain a similar insight in a deterministic and continuous time version of the
game. Both of these contributions deal with games with one state variable. To the best of our
knowledge, for no differential game with more than one state variable has a Markov-perfect
equilibrium exhibiting multiple locally stable steady states been calculated.
The aim of this paper is to fill this gap. The difficulty is that numerical methods rely-
ing on the canonical system derived from the Maximum Principle typically cannot be
used to characterize Markov-perfect equilibria, since knowledge about the derivatives of
the feedback strategies is needed to formulate the costate equations. Instead, we employ
Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations to characterize the value functions of the players and
the feedback strategies. The technical challenge in this respect is that in scenarios with coex-
isting stable steady states the feedback strategies of the players typically exhibit jumps, which
result in kinks in the value functions so that they are not everywhere differentiable. Standard
collocation methods based on polynomial approximations of the value functions are not able
to capture such kinks. Therefore, we propose an adaptation of a collocation algorithm, where
’local value functions’ on parts of the state space are generated and the actual value function
of the game is found as the upper envelope of these local value functions.
We use our method to solve a problem in the area of Industrial Organization where
incumbent firms have an option to innovate. In particular, we consider a duopoly in which
the two firms compete on a homogenous established product market, while at the same time
they are involved in an innovation race. The one who obtains the innovation breakthrough
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first gains the opportunity to introduce a new product on the market. The new product is a
strategic substitute of the established one, and it is better than the old one. Due to, e.g., patent
protection, the innovation laggard will never innovate, so it will keep on operating just on
the established product market.
It is an investment problem where initially the firms can invest in means (e.g., public
relations, lobbying) to increase the reservation price of the established product. At the same
time, they can invest in R&D to raise the innovation probability. R&D investments of both
firms have an additional effect in that they increase a public knowledge stock, which in turn
has a positive effect on the innovation hazard rate. After the innovation breakthrough, the
winner of the innovation race can invest to increase the reservation price of the new product.
As such, this technically leads to a multi-mode differential game (see Dockner et al.
[11]). Mode 1 describes the situation before the innovation breakthrough where we have
two state variables, namely the reservation price of the established product and the public
knowledge stock. Mode 1 passes into mode 2 at the uncertain point in time where firm 1
wins the innovation race. The two state variables in mode 2 are the reservation prices of the
established and the new product. In case, firm 2 wins the race, mode 1 is followed by mode
3, which has the same state variables as mode 2 with the difference that now firm 2 controls
the development of the reservation price of the new product.
Essentially, three different solutions will prevail. First, for high R&D costs, either innova-
tionwill not occur, or the innovation probability will be very low in the extraordinary case of a
very high initial public knowledge stock. Second, in the opposite case, thus where R&D costs
are low, either one of the firms will eventually innovate with probability one. Third, in case
R&D costs are neither low nor high, technically the most interesting situation arises where
history-dependent equilibria occur. In a state plane with the established product reservation
price on the horizontal axis and the public knowledge stock on the vertical axis, an upward-
sloping Skiba curve separates the initial situations leading to different solutions. Below the
Skiba curve, the initial knowledge stock is too low to guarantee a profitable innovation policy.
Therefore, the firms refrain from innovating and the resulting trajectory converges to a steady
state where nobody innovates and both firms are active on the established product market.
Above the Skiba curve, the firms are engaged in an innovation race where the resulting tra-
jectory converges to a steady state with a relatively high public knowledge stock. Since both
firms keep on investing in R&D, with probability one either one of the firms will eventually
innovate.
If we review the existing literature from an application point of view, thus considering
dynamic innovative duopolies, two papers have to be mentioned. First, we note that Breton
et al. [2] also analyze a setup with a public knowledge stock. Their result is similar to our
Skiba solution in that initial public knowledge should be high enough to guarantee that the
innovation will be obtained in the long run. The difference is that in Breton et al. [2] the R&D
decision is binary, they consider process innovation instead of product innovation, and they
have a discrete-time model, whereas our model is in continuous time. Employing a piecewise
deterministic dynamic oligopoly game like the present paper, is also done inHaurie andRoche
[16]. However, where we consider Markov-perfect equilibria, they develop Open-loop Nash
equilibria with jumps that relate to market size, rather than designing a new product as in our
case. An important observation at this point is that, to our knowledge, our paper is the first
to develop history-dependent equilibria in a piecewise deterministic game.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops themodel, whereas Sect. 3 describes
the derivation of the Markov-perfect equilibria. Section 4 provides a detailed account of the
numerical approach used in the paper. Solutions with a unique steady state, thus where
either R&D investment costs are high or low, are discussed in Sect. 5. The conceptual and
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numerical challenges associated with the Skiba scenario are treated in Sects. 6 and 7 presents
the economic insights obtained using the methodology developed in the previous section.
Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider the interaction of two firms producing a homogeneous established product based
on an old technology. The inverse demand for the established product at any time t is given
by
po(t) = αo(t) − (q1o(t) + q2o(t)),
where q f o(t) is the output of firm f = 1, 2 of the old product. The reservation price αo(t),
which is influenced by the public acceptance of the old product and its production technology
as well as by potential market obstacles due to regulatory measures, evolves over time with
αo(0) = αinio . Due to growing environmental concerns, the reservation price would converge
over time toward a level α̃o ≤ αinio if firms do not engage in measures enhancing the accep-
tance of the old technology. Such measures of firm f = 1, 2 boosting the acceptance of the
established product, including public relations activities or lobbying with policy makers, are
subsumed as I f o(t) ∈ R. The market size then evolves according to
α̇o = (I1o + I2o) − δo(αo − α̃o). (1)
At the same time both firms engage in R&D investments I f r ≥ 0, f = 1, 2 in order to
develop a new product based on a cleaner technology. For simplicity, it is assumed that the
firm which develops the new product first will be able to prevent the competing firm from
entering that market due to patent protection or other technological reasons. The hazard rate
of firm f is given by
h(I f r , z) = γ I f r z, γ > 0
where z(t) is the public knowledge stock. This formulation of the hazard rate captures that the
firms need to invest in own R&D in order to transform the publicly available knowledge into
an innovation breakthrough. Furthermore, we assume that there are spillovers from the firms’
R&D investment to the public knowledge stock. Hence, the dynamics of the knowledge stock
reads
ż = β(I1r + I2r ) − δr (z − z̃), β, δr > 0 (2)
where z̃ would be the stationary level of the public knowledge stock in the absence of firms’
R&D.
Once one of the firms has reached the innovation breakthrough it is able to offer a new
cleaner product,which is horizontally differentiated from the old product and has a reservation
price αn . The inverse demand system now reads
po = αo − (q1o + q2o) − ηq f n
pn = αn − η(q1o + q2o) − q f n, (3)
where it is assumed that firm f ∈ {1, 2} is the innovator and η ∈ (−1, 1) denotes the
horizontal differentiation parameter. For positive values of η the established and the new
product are substitutes and in what follows we will focus on such a scenario. Similar to the
established market, also the reservation price of the new product evolves over time and can
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be influenced by activities of the firm producing the new product, denoted by Iin ∈ R. In
particular, we have
α̇n = Iin − δn(αn − α̃n) (4)
and αn(0) = αinin < α̃n . The new product is assumed to be based on a more appealing
and cleaner technology, which implies that in the absence of any firm activities in the long
run the reservation price for the new product would be higher than that of the established
product. Hence, we assume α̃n > α̃o. Marginal production costs are assumed to be constant,
symmetric across firms and identical for both products. To save notation, we normalize them
to zero.
We model the interaction between the firms as a multi-mode differential game (see e.g.,
Dockner et al. [11] or Dawid et al. [8]). The initial mode m1 denotes the time period before
the new product is introduced, whereas the mode m2 corresponds to scenario where firm 1
has innovated (and firm 2 therefore will stick to the old product forever) and mode m3 to the
analogous case with firm 2 as the innovator. The mode process m(t) is a Markov process on
the set of modes M := {m1,m2,m3} in continuous time withm(0) = m1. The transition rate
from m1 to m2 is given by h(I1r , z), that from m1 to m3 by h(I2r , z) and all other transition
rates are zero.
In each mode quantities are determined by Cournot competition and straightforward cal-
culations yield for mode m1
qm11o = qm12o =
αo
3
, π
m1
1 = πm12 =
(αo
3
)2
(5)
for quantities and market profits.
Furthermore, in mode m2 we obtain, under the assumption that all quantities are positive,
qm21o =
(2 + η2)αo − 3ηαn
6(1 − η2) , q
m2
2o =
αo
3
, qm21n =
αn − ηαo
2(1 − η2) . (6)
Prices are obtained by inserting these expressions into (3) and the market profits read
π
m2
1 =qm21o po
(
qm21o , q
m2
2o , q
m2
1n
)+qm2in pn
(
qm21o , q
m2
2o , q
m2
1n
)
, π
m2
2 = qm22o po
(
qm21o , q
m2
2o , q
m2
1n
)
.
(7)
Analogous results arise in mode m3 with firm 2 as the innovator. Concerning the costs
of the different firm activities, it should first be noted that R&D investments are always
nonnegative, whereas the activities I f o, I f n influencing the general acceptance of a product
could in principle be negative, in particular, for a firm that is active on bothmarkets. Hence,we
assume quadratic costs for such activities, where cost functions are symmetric across firms,
i.e., ξh = νh2 I 2f h with h ∈ {o, n}, whereas R&D costs are of the form ξr = μr Irh + νr2 I 2f r . In
this formulation, for simplicity, the parameters associated with the linear lobbying cost are
normalized to zero. Whereas this normalization does not affect the qualitative properties of
the solution, such a normalization is not possible for the R&D costs. If R&D costs are purely
quadratic then optimal R&D investments are always positive, which precludes the existence
of a steady state with zero hazard rate. This would be a substantial alteration to the model,
of which the potential existence of such a steady state is an important characteristic.
The instantaneous payoff of firm f in the different modes is therefore given by
Fmki = πmki − ξo(I f o) − ξn(I f n) − ξr (I f r ), i = 1, 2.
The objective of firm f is to maximize its infinite horizon expected discounted payoff
under discount rate r > 0, subject to the state dynamics (1), (2) and (4), the mode process
m(t) as well as the control constraints I f r ≥ 0, f = 1, 2 and
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I1n = I2n = 0 m(t) = m1
I2n = 0 m(t) = m2
I1n = 0 m(t) = m3.
(8)
These constraints capture that a firm can influence the reservation price of a product only if
it is active on the corresponding market.
3 Characterization of Equilibria
In order to analyze the investment behavior of the firms in this model, we consider stationary
Markov-perfect equilibria (MPE) of the game. A stationary Markovian strategy of firm f
is given by a triple (φ f o, φ f r , φ f n), where each of these feedback strategies has the form
φ f h : [0, ᾱo] × [0, z̄] × [0, ᾱn] × M → R for h ∈ {o, n} and φ f r : [0, ᾱo] × [0, z̄] ×
[0, ᾱn] × M → R+0 . The upper bounds of the state variables, ᾱo, z̄, ᾱn are assumed to be
sufficiently large to ensure that the stable steady states characterized in the following analysis
are interior. Although we write the feedback in this general form, clearly some components
are irrelevant in some modes. In particular, due to (8), φ f n = 0 has to hold in mode m1 and
for the non-innovator also in mode m2 (respectively, m3). Furthermore, φ f r = 0 in modes
m2 and m3 since no more innovations are possible. Also, the state variable αn is constant
in mode m1 and the knowledge stock z irrelevant in modes m2 and m3. To ease notation
in what follows we will drop these arguments in the corresponding modes. In accordance
with the literature (see Dockner et al. [11]), we consider only non-anticipating strategies,
i.e., strategies where firms cannot condition their actions on realizations on the time of mode
transitions which lie in the future.
3.1 Post-Innovation Phase
In order to characterize the equilibrium strategy profile and the induced dynamics, we start by
considering modesm2 andm3. Since these modes are structurally symmetric, we can restrict
attention to m2. No transition out of this mode is possible, which means that the firms are
essentially engaged in an infinite horizon time-autonomous deterministic differential game.
Taking into account that the state z is irrelevant in m2, the value functions of the two firms
can therefore be written as Vm2f (αo, αn). The Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equations
for the two firms read
rVm21 (αo, αn) = maxI1o,I1n
[
π
m2
1 (αo, αn) − ξo(I1o) − ξn(I1n)
+ ∂V
m2
1
∂αo
(I1o + φ2o(αo, αn) − δo(αo − α̃o))
+ ∂V
m2
1
∂αn
(I1n − δn(αn − α̃n))
]
, (9)
rVm22 (αo, αn) = maxI2o
[
π
m2
2 (αo, αn) − ξo(I2o) +
∂Vm22
∂αo
(φ1o(αo, αn) + I2o − δo(αo − α̃o))
+ ∂V
m2
2
∂αn
(φ1n(αo, αn) − δn(αn − α̃n))
]
. (10)
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Maximization of the right hand sides of these two HJB equations gives
φ
m2
f o (αo, αn) =
1
νo
∂Vm2f (αo, αn)
∂αo
, f = 1, 2, φm21n (αo, αn) =
1
νn
∂Vm21 (αo, αn)
∂αn
. (11)
The interpretation of these terms is standard and straightforward. Due to the quadratic cost
functions, the optimal effort in changing the reservation prices is proportional to the marginal
value of such a change in terms of future discounted profits for the considered firm. Taking
into account (7), it is easy to see that the game in mode m2 has a linear-quadratic structure
and we therefore consider value functions that are quadratic polynomials of the states, i.e.,
Vm2f = A f + B f αo + CFαn + D f α2o + E f α2n + Ff αoαn, f = 1, 2.
Inserting this expression into (11) and the HJB Eqs. (9) and (10), and comparing the coeffi-
cients of the different terms on the left and the right hand side of the HJBs, generates a system
of 12 nonlinear equations for the 12 unknown parameters in the value function. This system
can be easily solved numerically using standard algorithms like a Newton method. Simi-
lar to the case of capital accumulation games with asymmetric product ranges (see Dawid
et al. [7]), typically there are multiple solutions among which only a single one induces
dynamics with a single steady state and therefore implies that the transversality conditions
for the firms’ optimization problems are satisfied. The equilibrium dynamics in mode m2 is
then characterized by a unique stable steady state and in what follows we will only consider
parameter constellations where both firms produce positive quantities of all the products they
are offering in that steady state. The analysis of mode m3 is analogous to that of mode m2
with the roles of the two firms inverted.
3.2 Pre-Innovation Phase
In modem1 the two firms are competing to generate the breakthrough to the new product and
technology.Hence, in thismode the situation of the twofirms is symmetric andwewill restrict
attention to symmetric equilibria where φm11h (αo, z) = φm12h (αo, z) = φm1h (αo, z), h ∈ {o, r}
for all (αo, z) ∈ [0, ᾱo] × [0, z̄]. In such a scenario, the two firms also have symmetric value
functions and denoting this value function by Vm11 = Vm12 = Vm1 we obtain the following
HJB equation in mode m1:
rVm1(αo, z) =max
Io,Ir
[(αo
3
)2 − ξo(Io) − ξr (Ir ) + ∂V
m1
∂αo
(
Io + φm1o (αo, z) − δo(αo − α̃o)
)
+ ∂V
m1
∂z
(
β(Ir + φm1r (αo, z)) − δr (z − z̄)
) + γ Ir z
×
(
Vm21 (αo, α
ini
n ) − Vm1(αo, z)
)
+ γφm1r (αo, z)z
(
Vm22 (αo, α
ini
n ) − Vm1(αo, z)
)]
. (12)
The feedback functions in mode m1, therefore, are given by
φm1o (αo, z) =
1
νo
∂Vm1(αo, z)
∂αo
, (13)
φm1r (αo, z) =
1
νr
max
[
β
∂Vm1(αo, z)
∂z
+ γ z
(
Vm21 (αo, α
ini
n ) − Vm1(αo, z)
)
− μr , 0
]
.
(14)
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The above expression for φr highlights that the optimal level of R&D investment is deter-
mined by three effects. First, R&D carried out by the firm increases the public knowledge
stock thereby influencing the future value of the game for the firm. Second, own R&D
positively affects the probability of a breakthrough at time t , which would make the firm
monopolist thereby inducing a jump in the value function of
(
Vm21 (αo, α
ini
n ) − Vm1(αo, z)
)
.
Third, investment is (negatively) influenced by the R&D cost parameters νr and μr .
4 Numerical Method
Inserting the optimal feedback strategies into (12) yields after minor transformations the fol-
lowing formulation of the HJB equation, which is the basis for the numerical characterization
of the equilibrium outcome:
0 =
(αo
3
)2 − ξo(φm1o (αo, z)) − ξr (φm1r (αo, z)) +
∂Vm1
∂αo
(
2φm1o (αo, z) − δo(αo − α̃o)
)
+ ∂V
m1
∂z
(
2βφm1r (αo, z) − δr (z − z̄)
)
+ γφm1r (αo, z)z
(
Vm21 (αo, α
ini
n ) + Vm22 (αo, αinin )
)
− (r + 2φr (αo, z)z)Vm1(αo, z). (15)
This is a nonlinear partial differential equation for Vm1 , and it is easy to see that contrary to
the situation in mode m2 the general form of the solution of this equation cannot be guessed
and a closed form solution seems infeasible. Hence, we rely on a numerical collocation
method to calculate an approximate solution for (12), see e.g., Dawid et al. [4] or Vedenov
and Miranda [21]. In particular, taking as state space [αlo, αho ] × [zl , zh] we construct a set
of basis functions {Bio,iz (αo, z), io = 1, .., no, iz = 1, .., nz} such that
bio,iz (αo, z) = Tio−1
(
−1 + 2(αo − α
l
o)
αho − αlo
)
Tiz−1
(
−1 + 2(z − z
l)
zh − zl
)
where Ti (x) denotes the i-th Chebyshev polynomial and no, nz are parameters determining
the number of basis functions. We denote the number of basis functions by n = nonz . The
value function is then approximated by
V̂ m1(αo, z) =
no∑
io=1
nz∑
iz=1
cio,iz bio,iz (αo, z),
which can be rewritten in a more compact way as V̂ m1(αo, z) = cT · b(αo, z), with c andb being n-dimensional vectors such that ci = cio,iz (respectively, bi = bio,iz ) for i =
(io − 1)nz + iz, io = 1, . . . , no, iz = 1, . . . , nz . Here and in what follows all vectors are
column vectors, vT denotes the transpose of the vector v and · the matrix product.
In order to determine the weights c of the base functions in this approximation, we require
that V̂ m1 satisfies theHJBEq. (12) on a set of nodesN = No×Nz ,whereNo = {αioo }io=1,...,no
(respectively, Nz = {ziz }iz=1,...,nz ) denote the set of no(nz) Chebyshev nodes on the interval
[αlo, αho ]([zl , zh]).1 Overall, the requirement that (15) holds at all nodes in N generates n
nonlinear equations, which are used to determine the weights c.
1 Since the state space is only two dimensional in our game the use of the full tensor product of one-dimensional
base functions and collocation nodes is computationally feasible for the problem at hand and turns out to imply
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More formally, we first introduce the three matrices B, Bαo and Bz , which contain the
values of all base functions and their partial derivatives at all nodes in N :
Bi, j = b jo, jz (αioo , ziz ), Bαoi, j =
∂b jo, jz (α
io
o , ziz )
∂αo
, Bzi, j =
∂b jo, jz (α
io
o , ziz )
∂z
with i = (io − 1)nz + iz, j = ( jo − 1)nz + jz, io, jo = 1, . . . , no, iz, jz = 1, . . . , nz .
Furthermore, we define the following vectors w f , f = 1, 2, capturing the value of the term
γ zVm2f at all nodes in N
w fi = γ ziz V m2f (αioo , ziz ), i = (io − 1)nz + iz, io = 1, . . . , no, iz = 1, . . . , nz .
Using this notation, the values of the feedback strategy at all nodes for a given vector of
approximation weights c can be expressed as
I o = 1
νo
Bαo c
I r = 1
νz
max
[
(βBz − γ Z B)c + w1 − μrIn×n, 0
]
,
(16)
where In×n is a n×nmatrix of 1s, Z is a n×nmatrixwith Zi, j = ziz , i = (io−1)nz+iz, io =
1, . . . , no, iz = 1, . . . , nz, j = 1, . . . , n and the maximum in the second line is applied to
each entry of the matrix. Using these vectors, the firm’s instantaneous payoff, the state
dynamics and the discount rate, adjusted for the transition rate to mode m2, at all nodes in
N can be directly calculated. We collect them in the vectors f , go, gz, r , which are defined
as follows
fi =
(
α
io
o
3
)3
− ξo( I oi ) − ξr ( I ri )
goi = 2 I oi − δo(αioo − α̃o)
gzi = 2 I ri − δr (ziz − z̃)
ri = r − 2γ I ri ziz ,
(17)
where again i = (io − 1)nz + iz, io = 1, . . . , no, iz = 1, . . . , nz . We can now write the
system of equations derived from the condition that (15) has to hold on all nodes in N , as
f + (go · ITn ) · Bαo · c+ (gz · ITn ) · Bz · c+ γ diag( w1 + w2) · I r − (r · ITn ) · B · c = 0. (18)
Here, diag(v) denotes the diagonal matrix of vector v and In the n-dimensional vector of
1s. It should be noted that I o as well as I r , and therefore also f , go, gz and r depend on c,
which implies that (18) is nonlinear with respect to c. In order to find a vector c satisfying
(18), we use an iterative algorithm, with the properties that in each step only a linear system
has to be solved and the fixed point of the iteration is a solution of (18). In particular, we
consider a sequence of vectors c(s), s = 0, 1, . . . and adjust the notation developed above by
denoting the vector of feedback controls which are calculated based on c(s) as I o(s), I r (s).
Analogously for the vectors f , go, gz, r . In each step of the iteration, c(s) is determined as
the solution to the following linear system of equations:
K (s − 1) · c(s) = f (s − 1) + γ diag( w1 + w2) · I r (s − 1). (19)
with
K (s − 1) =
(
(r(s − 1) · ITn ) · B − (go(s − 1) · ITn ) · Bαo − (gz(s − 1) · ITn ) · Bz
)
.
good convergence and approximation properties. For higher dimensional state spaces, the use of sparse grids
methods, like Smolyak bases and nodes (e.g., [18]), is required in order to obtain acceptable approximations
of the value functions in MPEs of similar games, see Dawid et al. [5].
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Intuitively, in each iteration first, the feedback controls of the players at all nodesN , based on
the previous approximation of the value function, are determined and then the value function
which results from these strategies is calculated. Clearly, if the value function calculated in
this way coincides with the approximation on which the determination of the control values
was based then this value function satisfies (15) in all nodes in N . More formally, any fixed
point c of (19) is a solution to (18).
Overall, the numerical algorithm can be summarized as follows:
(i) Choose no, nz and calculate the nodes in N . Choose the stopping condition ε.
(ii) Calculate B, Bαo , Bz as well as w1 and w2.
(iii) Choose c(0).
(iv) Calculate I o(0), I r (0) as well as K (0) and f (0)
(v) While Stopping Condition is not satisfied, iterate the following steps for s = 1, . . .
– Calculate c(s) by solving (19).
– Calculate I o(s), I r (s) as well as K (s) and f (s) based on c(s).
– Calculate the change in value function at all nodes: (s) = B · (c(s) − c(s − 1)).
Check Stopping Condition that maxi=1,...,n | (s)i | < ε.
(vi) Set V̂ m1(αo, z) = c(s)T · b(αo, z) and caculate the feedback functions based on (13)
and (14) using this approximation.
(vii) Check (e.g., by a plot of the vector field) that the state dynamics resulting from these
feedback functions is inward pointing at the entire boundary of the state space.
If the algorithm converges, the quality of the obtained solution is judged by considering
the maximum of the relative deviation in (15) from zero, i.e., res = max
[
(αo,z)
V̂ m1(αo,z)
|αo ∈
[αlo, αho ], z ∈ [zl , zh]
]
, where(αo, z) denotes the absolute value of the right hand side in the
HJB Eq. (15) for Vm1 = V̂ m1 . Since the value function is in our game strictly positive on the
entire state space, this indicator is well defined. For all results presented in this paper, we have
ε < 10−3. The aim of the algorithm is to find (approximate) value and feedback functions
which satisfy the HJB equation on the entire state space, whereas the algorithm itself only
guarantees that the HJB equation holds (approximately) on the set of nodes N . Therefore,
it is essential to check the residual of the HJB equation on the entire state space rather than
only onN . A small residual on the entire state space ensures that the value function used by
the firm to determine its feedback strategies is indeed very close to the expected discounted
profit of the firm generated by the profile of feedback strategies used by both firms, no matter
what the initial condition is. It should also be noted that if point (vii) in the description of
the algorithm holds, then this implies that the transversality conditions of both players are
satisfied.
In general, there is no guarantee for the convergence of this algorithm and the choice of the
number of nodes and of the vector c(0)determining the initial approximation are crucial in this
respect. Concerning the number of nodes, there is not only a tradeoff between the quality of the
approximation and the computation time, but an extensive number of experiments also shows
that the stability of the algorithm, in the sense that it converges for reasonably well chosen
initial conditions, deteriorates as the number of nodes increases. Unfortunately at this point,
there does not seem to be a rigorous mathematical analysis available, which characterizes the
relationship between the value of n and the stability properties of the algorithm. In light of this
tradeoff, the values no = nz = 10 have been chosen for the numerical analyses in this paper,
since this number of nodes generates solutions with very small residuals in the HJB equation
and at the same time the stability properties of the algorithm are still very good for the model
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considered here. In principle, alternative approaches, like a Newton algorithm, could also be
applied to find a solution of the nonlinear system of equations (18), however our numerical
experiments indicate that for this class of problems the chosen approach has better stability
properties, in a sense that convergence of the iterative algorithm can be obtained for a larger
set of parameters and initial values c(0). The number of iterations needed till convergence
varies strongly depending on the parameter setting and the initialization. Whereas in most
of the scenarios considered below convergence was obtained in less than 10 iterations, also
scenarios with approximately 100 iterations till convergence have been encountered.
With respect to the choice of c(0), the most crucial task is to come up with an initial
vector which generates convergence for the default parameter setting(s). Analyses of the
implications of variations in the parameters can then be carried out using a continuation
method, in which the parameter under consideration is changed in small steps and in each
step the previous solution is used as the initial value when the algorithm is applied to the new
parameter constellation. However, a continuation method can also be applied to generate the
initial value c(0) for the default parameter setting. In this respect, it is useful to first consider
the problem for a variation of the default setting, in which the discount rate is replaced by a
much larger value. This essentially static problem can be solved easily, and then the discount
rate can be stepwise reduced until its default value is reached.
5 Scenarios with Unique Steady States in Mode m1
Figure 1 illustrates the results generated with the method described in the previous section
by showing the value function in mode m1, the equilibrium feedback function for R&D
investment in mode m1, as well as the dynamics in the state space for a base parameter
setting2 and two different values of the R&D cost parameter μr . Whereas from a theoretical
perspective, there is no guarantee that the equilibria shown here are unique for each of the
parameter constellations, and our numerical explorations (e.g., with alternative initializations
c(0) of the algorithm) have not generated any alternative equilibria.
Considering the R&D investment functions and the state dynamics, it can be clearly
seen that qualitatively different equilibrium behavior emerges under these two levels of
R&D costs. For low values of μr (left panels) firms invest in R&D for almost all levels
of the public knowledge stock and public R&D investment alone is sufficient to move the
level of the knowledge stock into the regions where firms choose a positive level of R&D.
Accordingly, the unique stable steady state under thisMPE profile is characterized by positive
R&D investments of both firms, which also implies a positive hazard rate. Hence, with
probability one the innovation breakthrough will eventually be reached by one of the firms,
and a transition to mode m2 or m3 occurs. A substantially different picture emerges for high
levels of R&D costs (right panels). In such a setting, the minimal knowledge stock needed to
induce positive R&D investments of firms is so large that it is never reached in the absence
of firms’ R&D. Furthermore, even if the initial stock would be above this threshold the firms
R&D investment would be too small compared to the speed by which knowledge becomes
obsolete such that the knowledge stock would still decrease. Hence, in the unique steady state
both firms abstain from R&D investment, which implies that, although the public knowledge
stock converges to a positive level z̃, the hazard rates of both firms are zero. This means
2 The base parameter setting has been chosen in such a way such that the different assumptions made are
satisfied and quantities of both firms remain positive through the game. It is given by α̃o = 1, α̃n = 1.25, z̃ =
0.2, δo = δn = δz = 0.2, γ = 0.3, β = 0.5, νo = νn = 50, νr = 4, r = 0.05, αinin = 0.75, αlo =
0.75, αho = 1.35, zl = 0, zh = 2.
566 Dyn Games Appl (2017) 7:555–577
z
oα
1mV
z
oα
1mV
z
oα
1m
rφ
z
oα
1m
rφ
0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
z
oα
0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
z
oα
Fig. 1 Value functions in mode m1 (upper panels), R&D investment (middle panels) and induced state
dynamics (lower panels) for μr = 0.2 (left) and μr = 1 (right)
that, whenever the initial value of the knowledge stock is in the part of the state space where
φ
m1
r = 0, with probability one the breakthrough is never reached and both firms stay only
active on the established product market.
Comparing the value functions for the two values of μr , one can make the at first sight
the observation that for high values of the acceptance of the established product (αo) and low
levels of the public knowledge stock (z) an increase in the R&D cost parameterμr induces an
increase in the value function of the firms. For such values of the state variables, it is profitable
for the firms to coordinate on not engaging in the R&D race. However, for low values of μr
it is rational for each firm to invest in R&D regardless of whether the competitor pursues
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the innovation breakthrough or not. A high value of the R&D cost parameter then allows the
firms to coordinate in equilibrium on not investing, which increases their profit compared
to a situation where both engage in R&D. The situation is different if the acceptance of
the established product is low and the public knowledge stock is high. In such a scenario,
firms gain substantially from introducing the new product and at the same time the hazard
rates are relatively large, which implies that the expected duration of R&D expenditures till
the breakthrough are relatively small. Here, the expected gain from innovation outweighs
the costs and hence the value for the firms is larger if the R&D costs are so small that in
equilibrium there is positive R&D investment and transition to modes m2 or m3 occurs with
probability one.
6 Calculating Markov-Perfect Equilibria with Coexisting Stable Steady
States
6.1 Theoretical Considerations
Figure 1 as well as the intuitive discussion above shows that the firms’ incentive to invest
in R&D is an increasing function of the public knowledge stock as well as a decreasing
function of the acceptance of the old product. Considering now values of the R&D cost
parameter between the two used in Fig. 1, one would expect that for some values of μr firms
have no incentive to invest in R&D if the knowledge stock is close to the level z̃, but in
equilibrium engage with sufficient effort in R&D for large values of z such that a knowledge
stock substantially above z̃ can also be sustained in the long run. For such values of μr ,
the MPE of the game in mode m1 exhibits coexisting stable steady states. Although such
phenomena so far have hardly been treated in the framework of MPEs in differential games,
the extensive literature on coexisting stable steady states in dynamic optimization problems
(e.g., [3,4,15]) implies that generically the actions of the players exhibit a jump along the
curve separating the basins of attraction of the two stable steady states, which in the literature
is referred to as Skiba curve.
In general, this insight generates conceptual and numerical problems for the analysis.
First, there is a conceptual problem, since the jump in the action of the opponent along a
curve may induce a discontinuity of the value function of a player. In particular, this happens
if the player chooses values of the own controls such that the state does not cross the curve.
For asymmetric games, this implies that generically the player has an incentive to keep the
state on one side of the curve, namely the side where her value function is strictly larger. This
implies that in such a game anMPE inducing two coexisting stable steady states separated by
a Skiba curve can only exist under rather restrictive conditions. In particular, a Skiba curve
can exist if there is a controllability problem in the sense that the player cannot choose the
own controls such that the state moves from the part of the state space associated with the
lower value to the other part associated with the higher value. This issue is discussed in more
detail in Dawid et al. [6].
In the framework of a symmetric game, like the one considered here, the existence of a
symmetric MPE with coexisting stable steady states is less problematic, because in such an
equilibrium the value functions of both players coincide. If the boundary between the basins
of attraction of the two stable steady states is determined by the intersection of the ’local value
functions’ around the steady states (which are identical for both players), none of the players
has a jump in the value function, and the problem sketched above for asymmetric games does
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not arise. The local value functions capture the value of the game under trajectories which
result from optimal behavior of both players under the constraint that the state converges to a
certain (locally stable) steady state. More formally, let us assume that the state space in mode
m1 can be separated into two closed regions Sa,Sb such that Sa ∪ Sb = [αlo, αho ] × [zl , zh]
and the intersection S = Sa ∩ Sb is a connected curve in the state space. Assume further
that there exist functions Vm1a , V
m1
b which are continuous on Sa (respectively, Sb) and are
continuously differentiable in the interior of these regions. Furthermore, Vm1a (V
m1
b ) satisfies
the HJB equation (12) on the interior of Sa (Sb) and we have Vm1a = Vm1b along the curve S.
Finally, we define φm1hx , h = o, r, x = a, b as the feedback function resulting from inserting
Vm1x into (13) [respectively, (14)].
The fact that the two feedback functions exhibit jumps along the curve S in the state space
raises technical problems when considering the dynamic optimization problem of firm f
that results from inserting the feedback function of the other firm into the state dynamics
and the transition rates between modes. After this insertion, neither the state dynamics nor
transition rates between modes are continuous on the entire state space and therefore the
assumptions required for the standard result that the value function is the unique solution
(in the viscosity sense) of the HJB equation (see e.g., Theorems 2.8 and 2.12 in Bardi and
Capuzzo-Dolcetta [1]) do no longer hold. Actually, without these continuity assumptions in
general the dynamic optimization problem might not even be well defined, since for an own
control path inducing that the set of points in time at which the state crosses S has positive
measure, the solution to the state dynamicswould not bewell defined.Addressing this general
technical issue, which arises quite naturally in differential games if the feedback strategies
are not restricted to functions that are continuous with respect to the state is beyond the scope
of this paper. Hence, in what follows we restrict attention to strategy profiles, where for each
initial condition the set of points in time where the firms’ controls jump along the induced
state trajectory have measure zero. As will become clear from our numerical analysis below,
in the game considered here this restriction of the strategy space is not restrictive.
Given that we consider this strategy space, the following proposition shows that the com-
bination of the two local profiles described above generates a Markov-perfect equilibrium.
Proposition 1 The symmetric profile φ f h = φh, h = o, r, f = 1, 2 with
φh(αo, z) =
{
φha(αo, z) (αo, z) ∈ Sa
φhb(αo, z) else
constitutes a Markov-perfect equilibrium of the game in mode m1 if the two regions Sx , x =
a, b are invariant under the state dynamics (1, 2) for I f h = φh(αo, z), h = o, r, f = 1, 2.
Proof Consider the optimization problem of firm 1 assuming that firm 2 is choosing the
considered strategy (φo, φr ). Since V
m1
x is a smooth function satisfying the HJB equation
of firm 1 in the region Sx , x = a, b and trajectories stay bounded in Sx if firm 1 uses the
feedback function (φox , φr x ), it follows from standard arguments that no other feedback
strategy can generate a larger expected value for firm 1 as long as the state trajectory does not
leave the region Sx . Consider now an initial condition (αo, z)ini in the region Sx , x = a, b
and assume that there is an alternative feedback function (φ̃o, φ̃r ) generating a strictly higher
expected value for firm 1 than (φo, φr ) does. Due to the argument given above it must be
that the state trajectory induced by the profile (φ̃o, φ̃r ), (φo, φr ) crosses at least once the
boundary S between the two regions. In what follows we show that this assumption results
in a contradiction, where we first deal with the case where the induced trajectory exhibits a
finite number of jumps and, as a second step demonstrate that this implies also a contradiction
for all trajectories which cross S infinitely often.
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First, we consider the case with a finite number of intersections with S. Denote by (α̂o, ẑ)
the last point where the trajectory hits S. And assume without loss of generality that the
trajectory is in region Sa before it hits (α̂o, ẑ). Since Vm1a (α̂o, ẑ) = Vm1b (α̂o, ẑ), the expected
discounted payoff under the trajectory after hitting (α̂o, ẑ) must be V
m1
a (α̂o, ẑ). Since V
m1
a
is the value function for firm 1 for the problem on Sa this implies that if (α̃0, z̃) is any state
on the trajectory between (α̂o, ẑ) and the previous point where S is hit, the expected value in
that state cannot be larger than Vm1a (α̃0, z̃). The same argument can then be applied to the
previous part of the trajectory running in Sb and so on until the initial condition is reached.
Hence the value at (αo, z)ini cannot be larger than V
m1
x , which yields a contradiction.
Second, assume that the induced trajectory crosses S infinitely often. Denote this tra-
jectory by (α̃(t), z̃(t)). Given the assumption that this trajectory yields a higher value for
firm 1 compared to Vx ((αo, z)ini ) we must have Ṽ ((αo, z)ini )) > Vx ((αo, z)ini )), where Ṽ
denotes the value generated by trajectory (α̃(t), z̃(t)). Furthermore,we consider the trajectory
( ˜̃α(t), ˜̃z(t)) given by
( ˜̃α(t), ˜̃z(t)) =
{
(α̃(t), z̃(t)) t < T
(α̃(T ), z̃(T )) t ≥ T .
for some given T such that (α̃(T ), z̃(T )) /∈ S.We denote the value generated by this trajectory
by ˜̃V . Due to the exponential discounting in the objective function of firm 1 and the fact that
the instantaneous profit function is bounded from above, we have
lim
T→∞
˜̃V ((αo, z)ini ) = Ṽ ((αo, z)ini ) > Vx ((αo, z)ini ).
Therefore, there exists a T̃ such that ˜̃V ((αo, z)ini ) > Vx ((αo, z)ini ). The assumption that
the set of times where (α̃(t), z̃(t)) intersects S has measure zero, implies that ( ˜̃α(t), ˜̃z(t))
intersects with C only finitely often. Hence, we obtain a contradiction to the statement which
was shown in the first part of this proof. 
Proposition 1 implies that pasting in a continuous way two functions, which satisfy the
modem1 HJB equation on parts of the state space, yields the symmetric value function in this
mode for a symmetricMarkov-perfect equilibrium, provided that the two regions are invariant
under the induced equilibrium dynamics.3 Although in the context of the considered model
we show this property only for a scenario with two invariant parts of the state space, our
argument also holds in scenarios with a larger number of invariant subspaces as long as the
local value functions coincide at the boundaries between the associated regions.4
6.2 Numerical Approach
Whereas Proposition 1 provides a theoretical foundation for the characterization of symmetric
MPEswithmultiple stable steady states, also the numerical computation of the value function
in such scenarios is not straight forward. A jump of the firms’ actions along the Skiba
curve implies that the value function Vm1 exhibits a kink along this curve. The fact that the
collocation method relies on a polynomial approximation of the value function implies that
the approximate value function V̂ m1 by definition is smooth on the considered state space and
therefore cannot exhibit a kink. Hence, the procedure described in Sect. 4 has to be adjusted
3 Our formulation of the invariance corresponds to the condition that the dynamics is inward pointing used
in Dockner and Wagener [12]
4 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for making this observation
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if we deal with parameter constellations under which the MPE feedback strategies induce
state dynamics with multiple stable steady states.
In order to generate the ’local value functions’ around the two coexisting steady states, we
first generate two overlapping regions of the state space on which the local value functions
are calculated such that each region contains only one steady state. The curve S is then
determined as the intersection of the two local value functions. It is obvious that at a potential
steady state with no R&D investment we must have z = z̃. On the other hand, Fig. 1 and
the consideration of the complementarity between knowledge stock and R&D investment
suggests that the steady state with positive R&D is characterized by a knowledge stock
substantially above z̃. Hence, we choose the two overlapping regions of the state space
as Ra = [αlo, αho ] × [0, zha ] and Rb = [αlo, αho ] × [zlb, zh], where αlo, αho , zl , zh are given
according to our base parameter setting and we have zbl < z
a
h . For values of the R&D costs
μr between the values considered in Fig. 1 the collocation algorithm is applied separately
to these two regions. It is then checked whether each of the two regions is invariant under
the induced state dynamics, and, if this is the case, the (approximate) value functions are
appropriate local value functions on the considered part of the state space.5
In order to foster the generation of such appropriate local value functions, which induce
dynamics under which the region is invariant, it is useful to carefully select the initial guess of
the value function for the iteration in the collocation algorithm. To this end, when considering
the region surrounding the low investment equilibrium (i.e., Ra), we initially calculate the
value function for a value of μr , which is sufficiently large such that the zero R&D steady
state is the only stable fixed point in the whole state space (e.g.,μr = 1, see Fig. 1). The initial
guess c(0) for the collocation for the actual value of μr is then obtained by a continuation
method by decreasing μr in small steps and always recalculating the approximate value
function with the initial guess in the collocation given by the value function of the previous
step. Alternatively, a homotopy method could be used. However in multi-mode problems,
in which typically numerically determined value functions from other modes appear in the
HJB equation, the derivative of the right hand side of that equation with respect to the
changing parameter, which is needed for the homotopy, is often not available. Similarly, the
approximate value function onRb is obtained through a continuation method increasing μr
from a value where the unique stable steady state in the state space exhibits positive R&D
investment.
To determine the boundary between the basins of attraction of the two locally stable steady
states, the difference between the two local value functions Ra and Rb is considered in the
region [αlo, αho ] × [zbl , zah]. If the equation Ra(α, z) − Rb(α, z) = 0 holds on a closed curve
S such that on both sides of S the state dynamics, generated by the feedback strategies based
on the corresponding local value function, points inward, then Proposition 1 can be used to
conclude that the combination of the feedback strategies gives a Markov-perfect equilibrium
profile. Due to the fact that Ra(α, z) − Rb(α, z) is a polynomial in (α, z) the line S can
be easily calculated, if such a line exists. In the following section we use this approach
to analyze the firms’ equilibrium investment behavior in scenarios with two stable steady
states.
5 To be more precise, in such a scenario for each initial condition in the considered region there is no path
staying in the region which generates a larger expected value than the local value function.
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Fig. 2 Local value functions in mode m1 in region Ra (red) andRb (blue) for μr = 0.27
Fig. 3 Equilibrium feedback strategies for activities on the established market (left) and R&D investment
(right)
7 Economic Analysis for Scenarios with Multiple Steady States
in Mode m1
7.1 Pre-Innovation Phase
Applying the procedure described in the previous section allows us to compute the value
functions and corresponding feedback functions of an MPE for parameter settings of the
model where two stable steady states exist in the pre-innovation mode. Figure 2 shows the
result of these calculations for μr = 0.27 and zlb = 0.35, zha = 0.6. The local value function
on Ra is depicted in red, whereas that on Rb is blue. The Skiba curve S, determined by the
intersection of the two functions, can be clearly seen and the value function Vm1 is the upper
envelope of the two local value functions.
AS argued above, it follows from Proposition 1 that the value function Vm1 corresponds to
a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium in modem1 and in Fig. 3 we depict the equilibrium
feedback functions for activities building up acceptance of the established product and for
R&D investment. We observe that both feedback functions exhibit jumps along the Skiba
curve S. The state dynamics induced by this symmetric equilibrium strategy profile is shown
in Fig. 4. It can be clearly seen that indeed two locally stable steady states exist and their
basins of attraction are separated by the Skiba curve S indicated as a black line. We denote
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Fig. 4 State dynamics under the equilibrium feedback strategies and equilibrium trajectories for zini = 0.5
and αinio = 1 (green line), respectively, αinio = 1.25 (red line)
the equilibrium in the lower part of the state space, characterized by zero R&D as (αo, z)l∗m1
and the steady state with positive R&D as (αo, z)h∗m1 .
Considering again the equilibrium feedback functions it can be observed that, when mov-
ing from the basin of attraction of (αo, z)h∗m1 to that of (αo, z)
l∗
m1 , not only the investment in
R&Dexhibits a downward jump, but also the firms’ activities for strengthening the oldmarket
jumps upward. This is quite intuitive since in the basin of attraction of (αo, z)l∗m1 , and there
is a positive probability that the new product is never introduced and therefore the expected
future returns of increasing the reservation price for the established product are larger com-
pared to the scenario where the state converges to (αo, z)h∗m1 . This is also reflected in the
observation that αl∗o,m1 > α
h∗
o,m1 . Furthermore, quite in accordance with intuition, investment
in the strength of the establishedmarket decreases with the level of public knowledge stock in
the basin of attraction of the positive innovation steady state. The fact that the expected time
till the introduction of the new product decreases with z is driving this effect. No significant
effect of z on φm1o can be observed in the basin of attraction of the no-innovation steady
state. Investment in the strength of the established market increases with αo in both basins
of attraction. This is due to the fact that the quantities of the established product firms sell
increase with αo and therefore the marginal profit from increasing αo becomes larger the
larger the established market already is.
Turning to the firms’ equilibrium investment in R&D, we observe the same qualitative
properties as in the two cases depicted in Fig. 1. Due to the complementarity between public
knowledge and firms’ R&D, these investments increase with z. Furthermore, a large reserva-
tion price on the established market reduces the firms’ incentive to invest in R&D. Together,
these two properties imply that the Skiba curve, along which the firms’ strategies jump, is
upward sloping in the state space. This in turn implies that for a given level of the public
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knowledge stock the initial strength of the established market (captured by αo) can determine
whether in equilibrium there is persistent investment in the development of the new product,
which would mean that the product is introduced with probability one. Such a scenario arises
only if the initial strength of the established market is sufficiently small (i.e., (αo, z) is left
of the Skiba curve in Fig. 4). If the established market is strong, then, apart from a short
transient phase, firms abstain from investment in R&D, which implies that the probability
that the new product reaches the market is close to zero.
These insights have important implications for the understanding of the introduction of
a new product which is (abstracting from the firms’ activities to influence acceptance of the
products) more attractive for consumers than the established one. The result suggests that
under certain constellations of the R&D cost parameters and the level of public knowledge
stock, the strength of the established market might prevent the development and the intro-
duction of the new product. This insight has clear policy implications, which are discussed
in more detail in Sect. 8. Our results are also interesting from a technical perspective, since
to our knowledge this is the first instance of an MPE with coexisting stable steady states in
a differential game in which the dimension of the state space is larger than one and also the
first instance of such a phenomenon in a multi-mode differential game.
7.2 Post-Innovation Phase
After one firm has introduced the new product, the market dynamics and the incentives of the
competitors to invest in activities strengthening the established (as well as the new) market,
change significantly. Without loss of generality, we focus on the case of modem2 where firm
1 has been successful in introducing the new product. According to our assumption that the
new market for technical reasons or due to patent protection is characterized by such high
entry costs for firm 2 that this firm never enters, we have an asymmetric scenario, in which
firm 1 can influence the development of the strength of both markets, whereas the activities
of firm 2 are restricted to the established market.
Figure 5 shows the feedback functions of both firms in mode m2 for our base parameter
setting. Considering firm 2, which is only active on the established market, it can be observed
that investments in strengthening that market are positively affected by the size of that market
(like in mode m1) and negatively affected by an increase in αn . The intuition for this effect
is similar to the one discussed for m1, namely that an increase in αn reduces the quantity
firm 2 sells on the established market, which reduces the incentive to invest in an increase
in the (reservation) price of the established product. The monotonicity properties of firm 1’s
activities for influencing αo are the same as those of the investment of firm 2, however, Fig. 5
shows that it can actually be optimal for firm 1 to engage in costly activities to reduce the
strength of the establishedmarket although the firm is still active on that market. In particular,
this is true if the strength of the new market is above a certain threshold, where, as is to be
expected, this threshold is an increasing function of the strength of the established market.
The activities of firm 1 with respect to the strength of the new market are always directed
toward an increase in the size of that market. Analogous to the established market the level
of these activities are positively influenced by the strength of the market itself and negatively
affected by the size of the other market.
Figure 6 shows the evolution of the reservation prices in the two markets and the corre-
sponding trajectories of investments in both modes under the assumption that the realization
of stochastic innovation time is τ = 40. This means that we consider a situation where
the size of the established market has more or less reached the steady state value of the
pre-innovation phase before the innovation occurs. It can be clearly seen that the innovation
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Fig. 5 Equilibrium feedback functions for investment in the established market (upper panels) and the new
market (lower panel) in mode m2
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Fig. 6 Equilibrium dynamics of the reservation prices of both markets (left panel) and of investments in the
dynamics of the reservation prices (right panel) in both modes and (αo, z)ini = (1, 0.5). The time of the
introduction of the new product is assumed to be τ = 40.
leads to a downward jump in the investment of firm 1 in the established market and at the
same time to an upward jump of the activities of firm 2 on that market. The effort of firm 1
to strengthen the new market after its emergence are substantially larger than both the firms’
efforts on the establishedmarket prior to innovation and also those of firm 2 on the established
market after the innovation. This is due to the large market power of firm 1 with respect to
the new product, which results in large output quantities. Shortly after the innovation, the
investments of firm 1 with respect to the evolution of αo become negative and stay negative
in the long run. Therefore, the size of the established market shrinks to a value which is
Dyn Games Appl (2017) 7:555–577 575
20 40 60 80
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
t
oq1
oq2
nq1
Fig. 7 Quantity dynamics under the equilibrium feedback strategies in both modes and (αo, z)ini = (1, 0.5).
The time of the introduction of the new product is assumed to be τ = 40.
only slightly above the level α̃o which would emerge in the long run without effort by any
of the firms to influence the reservation price on that market. The reservation price of the
new product in the long run is larger than that of the established product, which does not
only reflect the higher basic attractiveness of that market (captured by α̃n > α̃o) but also the
substantially larger (net) investments in activities boosting the acceptance of that product and
its underlying technology.
The dynamics of output quantities corresponding to this scenario (see Fig. 7) highlights
the close connection between the firms investments in the evolution of the different markets
and their output quantities on these markets. Contrary to the investments, the output of firm 2
on the established market exhibits however no upward jump after the innovation. The effects
of the downward jump in the output of firm 1 on the established market is exactly neutralized
by the positive quantity of the new product, such that initially the quantity of firm 2 remains
unchanged after the innovation and only eventually decreases as the reservation price on
the old market goes down. Furthermore, the figure shows that for the considered parameter
setting the innovator over time reduces its output on the established market essentially to
zero thereby realizing a full transition from the old product and technology to the new one.
It should however be noted that firm 1 starts engaging in activities decreasing the size of the
established market at a point in time where it still produces substantial positive quantities
of that product. Overall, we end up in a scenario where each of the two firms completely
focuses on one of the two markets.
8 Conclusions
The most important contribution of this paper is technical in the sense that, to our belief, this
is the first paper generating a history-dependent solution in the setting of a Markov-perfect
equilibrium of a differential game with more than one state variable. In a model with two
state variables, a Skiba curve separates the basins of attraction of the different locally stable
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steady states. We design an adaptation of a collocation algorithm to develop the numerical
solution.
We apply our method to a duopoly model where the two identical incumbent firms both
have an option to carry out a product innovation. In a state plane with public knowledge on
the vertical axis and the reservation price of the established product on the horizontal axis,
the Skiba curve is upward sloping. If the initial values of the state variables are such that this
point is situated below the Skiba curve, the firms do not innovate. On the other hand, if this
point is located above the Skiba curve, it follows that with probability one the new product
will eventually be introduced on the market.
The location of a Skiba curve forms an important input for the policy maker. Consider a
situation where the new product is more environmental friendly and the initial values of the
state variables are such that it is located below the Skiba curve. Then, the market outcome
will be that the cleaner new product will not be invented. Essentially the policy maker has
two methods to still make innovation work. The first method is to move the initial point in the
state plane in such a way that it enters the desired area, which is above the Skiba curve. To
do so, the policy maker could either move the point of the initial states upward by increasing
public knowledge, for instance by subsidizing universities to do research in this area. Or the
policy maker could move this point to the left by taxing the use of the more dirty established
product, which reduces the reservation price.
The second method is to enlarge the basin of attraction of the innovation steady state, thus
moving the Skiba curve downward. This can be done by subsidizing R&D investments.
It is important to note that the Skiba curve is only an input for the policymaker: it just shows
what is needed to change an (undesired) market outcome. However, to determine whether it
is in fact optimal to do so requires a richer setting in which welfare should be optimized such
that, besides firm profits, also costs of the specific policy measure and consumer surplus are
taken into consideration.
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